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the cognitive reflection test (crt) is a hugely influential problem solving task that measures indi-
vidual differences in the propensity to reflect on and override intuitive (but incorrect) solutions. the 
validity of this three-item measure depends on participants being naïve to its materials and objec-
tives. evidence from 142 volunteers recruited online suggests this is often not the case. over half 
of the sample had previously seen at least one of the problems, predominantly through research 
participation or the media. these participants produced substantially higher crt scores than those 
without prior exposure (2.36 vs. 1.48), with the majority scoring at ceiling level. Participants that 
had previously seen a specific problem (e.g., the bat and ball problem) nearly always solved that 
problem correctly. these data suggest the crt may have been widely invalidated. As a minimum, 
researchers must control for prior exposure to the three problems and begin to consider alterna-
tive, extended measures of cognitive reflection.
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IntroductIon
Dual process models of human cognition typically make a distinction 
between fast and autonomous Type 1 thinking and slower, consciously 
controlled Type 2 thinking (Evans, 2008). The advantage of Type 1 
thinking is that it produces quick and approximate solutions to a given 
problem at little computational expense. However, while this system 
often provides good enough responses, it is susceptible to being misled. 
One of the main roles of Type 2 thinking is to reflect on and override 
such intuitive, but incorrect responses (Evans & Stanovich, 2013). 
People vary in their propensity to spontaneously engage in this 
type of reflective thought and these individual differences are associ-
ated with a variety of everyday consequences (Pennycook, Fugelsang, 
& Koehler, 2015). Pennycook et al. (2015) concluded that more reflec-
tive thinkers tend to be more rational, more sceptical, less religious, 
and hold fewer epistemically suspect beliefs. By far the most popular 
performance measure of individual differences in this propensity is 
known as the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005). The 
standard version of the CRT is made up of three problems, including 
the well-known bat and ball problem:
A bat and a ball cost $1.10 in total. The bat costs $1.00 more than 
the ball.
How much does the ball cost? (in cents) _________
The three problems all lure people towards an intuitive answer, 
driven by Type 1 processing. In the bat and ball problem, the intuitive 
answer that quickly comes to mind is 10 cents. However, this is incor-
rect. Those that spontaneously reflect on their response (using Type 2 
processes) quickly realise that the correct answer is actually 5 cents. 
Participants can score a minimum of zero and a maximum of three on 
this measure. Across a combined sample of 3,428 participants from 35 
separate studies, Frederick (2005) reported a mean score of 1.24 correct 
answers (sample means ranged from 0.57 to 2.18), suggesting that this 
measure is sensitive enough to capture individual differences and does 
not suffer unduly from ceiling effects (with only 17% of participants 
answering all three problems correctly). Importantly, variation on this 
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measure is associated with theoretically relevant outcomes (Pennycook 
et al., 2015) and taps into cognitive processes that are independent of 
intelligence and executive functioning (Toplak, West, & Stanovich, 
2011). 
The CRT has been hugely influential. The original paper (Frederick, 
2005) is cited over 1,700 times1, while the test has received extensive 
media and social media coverage. For example, it is featured in best-
selling popular psychology books such as Daniel Kahneman’s (2011) 
Thinking Fast and Slow. It has also been widely shared on social media, 
has been featured in the press (e.g., Business Insider and the New York 
Times), and is a staple component of introductory psychology courses 
(Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016).  
The validity of the CRT depends on participants being blind to its 
objectives, but this required level of naivety is threatened by widespread 
publication of the test materials. Once the logic behind this measure is 
known (or the solutions to any of the three problems are known), then 
the task is essentially invalidated as measure of cognitive reflection for 
that participant. Both the American Psychological Association (APA, 
2016) and the British Psychological Society (BPS, 2016) warn that 
widespread public disclosure of the objectives or materials of a psy-
chological test can cause irreparable harm to its validity. This is of par-
ticular relevance to the CRT for three reasons. First, the nature of the 
test requires that participants are naïve to its objectives. If participants 
are aware that the three problems are “trick questions”, they will be less 
likely to trust their instincts and be more likely to engage a critical, 
Type 2 style of thinking (Chandler, Mueller, & Paolacci, 2014). Second, 
the test only consists of three items, each of which has a single correct 
answer, meaning that some people may simply memorise that correct 
answer. Third, the populations typically sampled by psychologists (i.e., 
psychology undergraduates and participants recruited through online 
participant pools) are precisely the groups that are most likely to have 
previously come across the CRT. 
In this paper, it is argued that the standard version of the CRT 
is becoming a victim of its own success. Individual variation in the 
CRT reveals the capacity for reflecting on Type 1 responses, but as 
this measure becomes increasingly popular among researchers and is 
more widely publicised by the media, this variation may be polluted 
by prior exposure to the test materials. Toplak, West, and Stanovich 
(2014) noted the potential for future complications with the CRT 
as the three items become increasingly well known, while Thomson 
and Oppenheimer (2016) presented evidence that most participants 
recruited using the Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) had previ-
ously encountered at least one problem from the CRT, and that these 
participants significantly outperformed those with no prior experi-
ence (mean scores of 1.90 vs. 1.29). Similarly, Chandler et al. (2014) 
tested participants recruited using MTurk and found a strong positive 
correlation between the extent of prior participation in online studies 
and performance on CRT (r = .79) but no such correlation for a novel 
version of the CRT, in which the standard wording of the problems was 
changed (r = .04). 
These data suggest that the CRT is at risk of becoming an invalid 
measure of cognitive reflection, yet researchers habitually fail to con-
trol for prior exposure. In the experiment reported below, participants 
completed the CRT and were then asked about their prior exposure to 
each of the three problems. The first aim was to replicate findings de-
scribed above using a more general online sample. Both Thomson and 
Oppenheimer (2016) and Chandler et al. (2014) recruited participants 
through MTurk, which has recently received attention for having much 
smaller and less diverse pool of participants than previously thought 
(Stewart et al., 2015), thus increasing the likelihood of prior exposure. 
Therefore we recruited participants through a variety of different 
online platforms (detailed in the Method section) to try and access a 
wider population of potential participants and see if the effect extends 
beyond the limited MTurk population. The second aim was to build on 
these prior findings by examining the extent to which exposure to any 
given CRT problem influences performance on that specific problem. 
Finally, the third aim was to identify the source of any such exposure 
(e.g., in previous research or in the media). 
It is hypothesised that participants who report prior exposure to at 
least one problem from this measure will produce substantially more 
correct answers than those without prior exposure (replicating the 
results of Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). However, not all of these 
participants will have seen all of the problems. The bat and ball prob-
lem, for instance, is thought to be much more well-known than the 
other two problems (Toplak et al., 2014). A more specific prediction 
is that participants who have previously seen a specific problem (e.g., 
the bat and ball problem) will outperform the remaining participants 
on that specific problem, with a level of performance that is close to 
ceiling. To identify the source of prior exposure, participants were also 
asked to disclose where they had previously come across the materials 
(e.g., in previous research or in the media). These data will allow for 
an assessment of the extent to which the three CRT items have been 
invalidated by prior exposure, while also identifying the sources of this 
exposure in an effort to raise awareness around issues of test security 
(cf. APA, 2016; BPS 2016). 
Method
Design and Participants
The primary aim of this study was to compare performance on the 
CRT between those participants that reported prior exposure to any 
of the three problems and those with no prior exposure. Therefore the 
a priori sample size was calculated for a two-tailed between-subjects t-
test with an anticipated effect size of d = 0.5 (medium), a desired power 
level of .8 and a probability level of .05. Based on these assumptions, the 
a priori minimum sample size was calculated to be 128.
Volunteers responded to online adverts seeking participants to 
take part in a short problem solving task. The adverts were posted to 
social media sites (Reddit, Facebook, Twitter) and online participant 
pools (Call for Participants [www.callforparticipants.com] and Prolific 
Academic [www.prolific.ac]). Posts on social media sites were only 
made to dedicated research participation forums or groups (e.g., Reddit 
Participants, Reddit Sample Size, and the Psychology Studies Twitter 
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feed). Participants who completed the study via Prolific Academic (n = 
44) were paid £0.5, while the remaining participants were not offered 
an incentive. A total of 142 volunteers completed the task (65 male, 
72 female, 5 preferred not to disclose their gender; Mage = 28 years). A 
further 23 volunteers consented to take part but provided no data, so 
their responses were excluded. 
Materials and Procedure
Participants were first asked to complete the standard CRT (Frederick, 
2005). After completing the CRT, they were asked, “Have you ever 
come across any of these three problems before today?”, with the re-
sponse options “Yes”, “No”, and “Don’t know.”  The primary aim of this 
study was to compare performance on the CRT between those that had 
prior exposure to this measure (those that answered “Yes”) and those 
with no prior exposure (those that answered “No” or “Don’t Know”). 
Those participants that answered positively were presented with three 
additional questions. The first asked them to select which of the three 
items they had seen previously (“Which of the three problems have you 
come across before today? [Select all that apply]”), with the options, 
“Problem 1 - BAT AND BALL”, “Problem 2 – WIDGETS”, “Problem 
3 - LILY PADS”). The second asked if they believed they had previ-
ously seen the correct answer to these problems, with the response 
options “Yes”, “No”, and “Don’t know” (the correct answers were not 
given to participants). The third asked participants to describe where 
they had previously seen the items (with responses typed into a text 
entry field). 
results
The overall mean score on the CRT was 1.93 correct answers (SD = 
1.17). A total of 73 participants (51.4%) reported that they had previ-
ously been exposed to at least one of the problems from the CRT. Of 
these participants, 33.3% had seen the problems in previous research 
studies, 30.6% had seen them in popular media, which included books, 
websites and social media, 22.2% had seen them in school or university, 
while 18.1% either did not know or did not answer2. Of the remaining 
participants, 56 (39.4%) stated that they had not come across any of 
the problems before, while 13 (9.2%) did not know if they had come 
across the problems before. The latter two groups were combined in the 
analyses reported below. 
The mean score of those with prior exposure to any problem from 
the CRT (M = 2.36, SD = 0.96) was significantly higher than the mean 
score of those with no prior exposure to the CRT (M = 1.48, SD = 1.21; 
t[140] = 4.802, p < .001, d = 0.81). The group that had previously been 
exposed to the CRT produced, on average, 0.88 more correct answers 
than the group with no prior exposure. This was a large effect (d > 0.80; 
Cohen, 1977). Table 1 shows that the majority of participants in the 
prior exposure group obtained the maximum possible score. Within 
the prior exposure group the specific source of exposure (e.g., previous 
research, media, school or university etc.) had no effect on CRT mean 
scores, F(3, 71) = 1.54, p = .213.
Some of those who had previous exposure to the CRT also believed 
they had previously seen the correct answer to at least one of the ques-
tions (n = 34). These participants scored higher on the CRT (M = 2.59, 
SD = 0.82) than those who had previous exposure but had not previ-
ously seen any correct answers (M = 2.13, SD = 1.04; t[70] = 2.05, p = 
.045, d = 0.49) and higher than those with no previous exposure to the 
CRT (M = 1.48, SD = 1.21; t[101] = 4.83, p < .001, d = 1.07). 
The analyses above show that exposure to at least one CRT problem 
increases scores on the test as a whole. One reason for this may be due 
to participants scoring close to ceiling level on those specific problems 
that they have previously been exposed to. If they remember a specific 
problem, they may also remember that the problem is a trick ques-
tion (or even remember the correct answer, if known). It is therefore 
predicted that responses to previously seen problems will nearly always 
be correct. To investigate this, participants that had been previously 
exposed to the CRT were also asked which of the three problems they 
had seen previously. An individual item analysis was conducted to 
determine whether the effect of prior exposure to a specific item influ-
enced performance on that specific item. It is conceivable that one or 
more items may be relatively immune from the effect of prior exposure 
(e.g., if the correct solution to a given problem is easily forgettable, or 
if a given problem seems less like a trick question than the others). The 
individual item analysis presented in Table 2 shows that none of the 
items were immune to the effects of prior exposure. Prior exposure to 
any one of the three problems was associated with a greater percent-
age of participants providing a correct answer to that specific problem. 
Indeed, the majority of participants with prior exposure to a specific 
problem solved that problem correctly. This is just one way in which 
prior exposure may influence total score on the CRT. It is also likely 
that knowing at least one problem is a trick question leads participants 
to treat other (previously unseen) problems as trick questions, hence 
improving performance on these previously unseen items. However, 
this possibility could not be tested directly with the data available, as 
tAble 1.  
Percentage of Participants scoring 0, 1, 2, or 3 on the crt stratified by Prior exposure to Any of the three Problems
Percentage of participants scoring 0, 1, 2, or 3
Mean CRT 0 1 2 3
Prior Exposure (n = 73) 2.36 8.2% 9.6% 20.5% 61.6%
No Prior Exposure (n = 69) 1.48 30.4% 20.3% 20.3% 29.0%
Overall (N = 142) 1.93 19.0% 14.8% 20.4% 45.8%
 
Note. CRT = Cognitive Reflection Test.
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the majority of participants had previously seen either all three of the 
CRT problems or none of the CRT problems. 
dIscussIon
The CRT is a hugely influential measure of individual differences in the 
propensity to override Type 1 intuitions. It is uniquely associated with 
performance on a number of heuristics and biases tasks (Toplak et al., 
2014) and with a variety of everyday consequences (Pennycook et al., 
2015). However, the data presented here and elsewhere (Chandler et 
al., 2014; Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016) suggest that it is becoming 
a victim of its own success. 
Over half of the participants in this study (51.4%) had previously 
seen at least one problem from the CRT. Most of these had encountered 
the materials through previous research participation, in the popular 
media, or in school or university. This group scored very highly on the 
CRT, with an average of 2.36 correct answers (from a possible maxi-
mum of three). They significantly outperformed participants with no 
prior exposure to this measure (M = 1.48) in addition to outperform-
ing the mean score of 1.24, which Frederick (2005) calculated from a 
sample of over 3,000 participants. Indeed, the majority of participants 
who reported prior exposure to at least one item performed at ceiling 
level. Analysis based on exposure to specific test items revealed that 
nearly all participants with prior exposure to a specific problem went 
on to solve that problem correctly. 
These findings suggest that performance on the CRT is not only 
influenced by individual differences in the propensity for cognitive 
reflection, but is also heavily influenced by individual differences in 
prior exposure. Those who had previously seen one or more of the 
problems produced higher scores on this measure. Therefore, the CRT 
may no longer be a valid measure among this group of participants3. 
Researchers habitually fail to ask about or control for prior exposure 
to the three problems, but given the results outlined above it is recom-
mended that from now on those using the standard CRT (or any of its 
variants) should explicitly ask participants about prior exposure. The 
most conservative method of dealing with prior exposure is to exclude 
those participants that have previously seen any of the problems. This 
is particularly recommended when only a small proportion of a sample 
has previously been exposed to the CRT. However, when a large pro-
portion of the sample has previously been exposed, as is typically the 
case following online recruitment, a more pragmatic approach could 
be considered. Rather than excluding what could be over half of the 
sample, an alternative approach is to statistically control for this issue 
by treating exposure as a between subjects factor. Any differences be-
tween these groups should then be clearly acknowledged. 
Given the growing popularity of the CRT, the problem of expo-
sure is only likely to get worse. Fortunately, there is a simple solution. 
Chandler et al. (2014) showed that performance on a novel version 
of the CRT did not correlate with prior experience of online studies; 
therefore changes to the surface content of these problems may be suf-
ficient to negate the effects of prior exposure. Indeed, there are now 
several alternative measures, including extended four-item and seven-
item versions of the CRT (Toplak et al., 2014), the four-item CRT-2 
(Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016) and the six-item CRT-Long (Primi, 
Morsanyi, Chiesi, Donati, & Hamilton, 2015). These measures offer 
validated alternatives but differ in the degree to which they overcome 
the problems described above. For example, the CRT-Long and the 
seven-item version of the CRT developed by Toplak et al. (2014) still 
contain the three original problems used by Frederick (2005), which 
may have been widely invalidated. However, the four-item version de-
veloped by Toplak et al. (2014) contains none of the original items, nor 
does the CRT-2 (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016). 
A limitation of all the new measures described above is that they 
are still relatively short (the longest is made up of seven problems), and 
therefore the individual items risk invalidation if circulated widely. In 
addition, all of the new problems used in these tests maintain the ap-
pearance of a trick question (i.e., where the solution seems too obvious 
to be correct). Many research participants are now aware of the logic 
behind this type of question, possibly encouraging them to engage a 
more critical, Type 2 style of thinking. Nevertheless, these measures 
provide an improvement on the original CRT, but work is still required 
to create longer measures with problems that avoid the appearance of 
being a trick question. One possible avenue for achieving this goal is to 
make use of belief bias syllogisms, as these problems can lead people to 
endorse intuitively believable, yet logically invalid conclusions. These 
problems differ in surface structure from the standard CRT problems 
but strongly correlate with the CRT and predict the same cognitive 
outcome measures (Thomson & Oppenheimer, 2016).
tAble 2.  
Percentage of Participants that Provided a correct solution to each of the three Problems, 
stratified by Previous exposure to that specific Problem
% correct responses to each problem
Prior exposure No prior exposure Chi-square
Problem 1: Bat and Ball 73.8% (n = 61)
40.7%
 (n = 81) χ
2(1, N = 142) = 15.33, p < .001
Problem 2: Widgets 87.2% (n = 47)
53.7%
 (n = 95) χ
2(1, N = 142) = 15.51, p < .001
Problem 3: Lily Pads 86.5% (n = 52)
63.3%
 (n = 90) χ
2(1, N = 142) = 8.77, p = .003
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The issue of test security is one that researchers should be aware of. 
Short, well publicised measures such as the CRT are particularly vul-
nerable to invalidation and this problem is particularly acute amongst 
populations that regularly take part in psychology research (e.g., online 
and undergraduate participant pool members) and those who take an 
interest in popular psychology. Indeed, these groups are far from in-
dependent, so it should not be surprising that such a high percentage 
have come across this measure before. Researchers who use the CRT or 
any of its variants should be wary of this limitation and take measures 
to control for it. 
Footnotes
1 Google Scholar, September 2016.
2 Total sums to greater that 100% because some participants re-
ported exposure to the problems from more than one source (e.g., in 
previous research and on social media).
3 As a caveat, Thomson and Oppenheimer (2016) speculate that 
prior exposure may make the CRT easier and therefore be beneficial 
in reducing floor effects in some populations (therefore increasing 
variance). However, the data presented above indicate that any such 
advantage would be counteracted by a substantial increase in ceiling 
effects
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